U.S. bombs Iran, as predicted: what happens next?

I had predicted back on June 15 that the United States was poised to bomb Iran after June 21, and then reiterated this on June 18. U.S. did bomb Iran on June 22. (For new readers, I had also predicted back in March 2025 itself that Iran would be attacked by Israel or the U.S. by June 21, with the date of June 13, when Israel first attacked Iran, marked as a critical date. Israel did strike Iran on June 13!)

From this, you will have judged I read Iran exceptionally well: you will find several predictions related to Iran going correct in my 2024 list of successful predictions, including, again, the exact date, manner and event of Iran's launching of missile attack onto Israel in April 2024, which had been in response to Israel's Damascus embassy attack.

I recall the track record here so that what I am about to say carries some weight for you, especially new readers, who do not know my work well.

The following discussion is for the period from June 21 to September 22, 2025 (Iran/Israel times).

Let us start with Iran.

One, charts lead me to believe that Iran will retaliate for now rather than go to the negotiating table. Towards late August or in September, negotiating table could be possible, but for now it seems retaliation. And, surprisingly, it seems an effective one, though Iran's military options look very weak right now, as charts also indicate military losses for Israel in this period and some kind of strong military success for Iran. Charts suggest that Iran's retaliation will be talked about a lot among the people and in the media, that it will make a lot of news, so it may not be just the usual thirty-forty missiles' barrage that it has been launching on Israel with only some damage.

Two, there will certainly be attempt of regime change in Iran done by Israel and its allies, and it may succeed, too. In fact, Iran is very highly likely to go through strong changes in its identity as a state and in the nature of its state during the next several years, so the current Khamenei regime will go sooner or later. It may go before September 22 itself.

Three, people in Iran seem galvanised and even optimistic in this period. Is it because Iran is starting to have some unexpected military successes against the enemy, or is it because of the regime change, and hence many people are relieved with that, feeling optimistic about a new regime, and at the same time wary against Israel/U.S. who may try to set up a compliant, dummy regime in Iran (for example, exiled crown prince Reza Pehlavi)? This is difficult to say right now.

Four, relations with countries in the region look quite afflicted for Iran for next several years. While this could be thought of as showing Israel itself, which is in the region even if not a direct neighbour, but I am leaning towards the idea that Iran is going to have problems with countries much closer to it in terms of physical distance, that is, some of the Arab states. This brings me back to wonder about Point One: what will the retaliation be like? Is Iran going to target U.S. bases in Arab states? Geopolitically speaking, if Khamenei feels he has nothing to lose anymore, he may throw in this as a last dice, hoping that the wider war and scramble to save precious oil and gas assets that sparks from this may draw Russia and China, reluctant so far, to also join in the war, because Iran desperately needs some military help/ally right now. This, however, would be economically ruinous for Iran. But I don't foresee Iran taking a diplomatic solution right now, particularly given that Trump is not even offering any meaningful diplomatic solution, instead asking for "unconditional surrender."

Five, what about the Strait of Hormuz? In my Saturn in Aries piece, where I had again warned that Iran would face major geopolitical events in the 2025-2028 period, I had not mentioned waterways explicitly, but I did mention the imbalance of water in the form of climate instability. In addition, Uranus, the disruptor, is about to enter Gemini, the sign governing conduits and borders. Thus, the closure of Hormuz could happen, though I don't see it as the centrepiece of Iranian retaliation, and I don't find it prominent either on Iran's charts. To me, rather, what looks more likely, contrary to some geopolitical experts' opinions, is that Iran could strike important Israeli assets or bases, or even U.S. bases in the region.

If we look at my predictions for Israel, things seem to match with what I said above.

I also said for Israel that "[r]elations with some far away foreign country to solidify during this period, which may bring benefit for the country." Certainly, with its June 22 actions, U.S. has firmly committed itself to Israel, probably even against its self-interests, so the actions of this "far away foreign country" are already bringing benefit to Israel.

As I said earlier, I predict military reverses for Israel in this period, and the next several years could be marked with a high mortality. (In fact, the period around January 2027, now only one and half years aways, has been long marked by me on my Critical Dates page as negative and critical for Israel.)

The one interesting thing about my Israel's predictions is that Netanyahu's days at the top of the power tree seem numbered to me. I say that a foreign country might be behind it. United States? Trump may have done what Netanyahu wanted, but if U.S. gets dragged into a war here, which would prove to be very unpopular in the U.S., then he would privately hate Netanyahu.

Let us look at my United States predictions then.

One, I have already predicted this many times, even back in November 2024 itself, that this particular three-month period would bring sharp loss of reputation for Trump. If the war drags on, then the MAGA base would not take kindly to Trump, while many other sections of society are already against war. I have also suggested that Trump may soon give way to Vance as the President, most probably within the next six months, with September 2025 looking an especially critical month.

Two, I predicted that U.S. would "indulge in much wasteful expenditure on military activities" during this June 21 to September 22 period. It remains to be seen how effective the bombing was to destroy the nuclear sites, and was it even needed, but waste may already have started. It seems that this was not a one-off if I read my prediction well: that the U.S. would continue indulging in this wasteful expenditure.

Three, I have predicted the "[d]eath of soldiers or law enforcement officers or firefighters in some incident or while at their work during this period" for the United States. Is Iran going to hit U.S. bases, and would it lead to the death of some American soldier? If that does happen, I expect Trump to hit hard Iran, and it remains to be seen what would come of it, especially with the stances then taken by China and Russia.

Let us look, finally, at the two prosperous Arab states of UAE and Saudi Arabia, both to the south of Iran, who may be relishing Iran's humiliation but also afraid of what comes next.

For the UAE, I had foreseen troubles for the country on relations with countries in its region. These were my exact words: "Relations with a country in the region may be a cause for concern and may be undermined by a foreign hand. A nearby/neighbouring country could play deception. It is important to remember that the country has now entered a long, difficult or confusing period when it comes to foreign relations, especially when it comes to relations with countries in its region." Is the foreign hand playing deception Israel or Iran?

In addition, I had also seen a financially difficult time for the country, increase in religious power and someone dying in the echelons of power.

It is Saudi Arabia, though, which has the more worrying charts.

For one, finances look to undergo radical changes and difficulties over the next several years. Two, I also see strong and manifest popular discontent against the rulers in the country. Is it because of indirectly supporting Israel? For any Muslim land, support, whether explicit or implicit, would make the ruling government very unpopular. On the foreign relations front for Saudi Arabia, it looks a mixed picture: I say that while relations may improve with some country, maybe even an important agreement or treaty signed, relations with most other countries look rocky on the charts.

Regarding China, I do not foresee its armed forces entering into any kind of military conflict during this 3-month period. So even if China were to come to the support of Iran in any way, it may do so only through financial, logistical or material support to groups or governments, not through any direct intervention of armed forces. Russia, on the other hand, does have a strong reshaping of foreign relations in the next several years, beginning with this period. Is Russia going to align with the U.S., ditching Iran or at least the Khamenei regime?

Finally, we look at Turkey, the preeminent power in this area and which is a direct neighbour to Iran. Turkey's charts paint a complex picture. For one, they show troubled foreign relations, especially with some of the countries in its region; two, financial difficulties; and three, that the country would be moving into a long period of military build-up. The third point is quite logical: after seeing the condition and fate of Iran, many countries in the world, especially Turkey, would now seek to arm themselves heavily, especially with nuclear weapons, for, after all, Israel is felt as a strong threat in the future by all other countries in the region even if today some may be tacitly supporting Israel. I can understand the second point, too, with all the geopolitical happenings plus Iran's refugees that would start pouring into Turkey. But I am intrigued with the first one, the troubled foreign relations prediction. Is Turkey going to have some troubled relations with Israel?

I would have loved to look at Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but I never have had the time to set up charts for these countries, so for now at least, I, and my readers, will have to live with a slightly less rounded picture.

As the situation will update, I may post new, additional insights. Till then, stay safe and sane. Also, please share my work with any friends, family, journalists, writers and social media circles that you may be a part of, so that it gets its due recognition. You will be doing a service not just to me but to astrology, which is often derided for being vague.

Note: Regularly updated lists of some of my successful predictions in the past can be found here. They include U.S. bombing of Iran, Israel's strike on Iran, the timing of India's missile strikes on Pakistan, the death of Pope Francis, Trump win, South Korea martial law events, several elections correctly called, and numerous earthquakes and other natural disasters.

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